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ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to offer a group-based approach to reparations for slavery. I argue
that by appealing to a group-based approach to reparations, one can avoid some of the significant
problems associated with attempting to justify reparations on an individual level. I argue that,
properly formulated, a group-based approach can avoid problems of identification, the nonidentity problem, as well as misgivings about appealing to the notion that groups can have a
moral standing that is not merely the aggregation of the moral standing of the individual group
members. In order to show that a group-based approach is a viable solution to these issues, I
appeal to Larry May’s account of groups.
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INTRODUCTION

Despite the ratifying of the thirteenth amendment in 1865, which codified an end to the
enslavement of Africans in the United States, the conditions surrounding the lives of AfricanAmericans today is, at best, bleak. Today, African-Americans face discrimination, incarceration
and poverty at much higher rates than white Americans. Surely one would agree that the slaves,
after being freed, were due some sort of compensation for the injustice they endured for
hundreds of years. Despite attempts, however, no reparations were ever paid.1 And if it is true, as
some suggest, that the current situation for African-Americans has its origins in slavery, the
subsequent Jim Crow era, and the fact that reparations were never paid to the freed slaves, one
might argue that African-Americans today have justified claims to reparation.
The literature on reparations for African-Americans is extensive, and some authors argue
that it is impossible to justify claims to reparations for slavery. Chandran Kukathas, for instance,
argues that in order to justify reparations claims, one must be able to clearly identify both the
victim of the injustice as well as the perpetrator of the injustice. Given the immense difficulty in
identifying both agents in the case of slavery, Kukathas argues that the paying of reparations for
slavery cannot be justified.
Nahshon Perez is also critical of our ability to justify reparations for past injustices.
According to Perez, because the descendants of the original victims of the injustice would not
exist had the injustice not occurred, then are not harmed by the injustice. The non-identity

Perhaps the most famous attempt to provide reparations for slavery is William Sherman’s 40 acres and a mule
plan. In the nineteenth century, the American Colonization Society attempted to institute a resettlement plan for
freed slaves. The plan included resettling freed slaves to Liberia. In 1866, Representative Thaddeus Stevens
introduced a reparations bill. In 1989, Representative John Conyers first introduced a bill to establish a commission
to study both the present-day effects of slavery on living African-Americans, as well as the appropriateness of
potential reparations payments. Conyers has introduced this bill in each congressional session since 1989.
1
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problem according to Perez raises significant problems for our ability to justify reparations for
past injustices.
In my paper, I will respond to the critiques made by both Perez and Kukathas, and show
that it is possible to justify reparations for some historic injustices, specifically in the case of
slavery in the United States. I will argue that using a group-based approach to reparations, one
can avoid the issues raised by Perez and Kukathas. That is, by conceptualizing the claims to
reparations as a group-based claim, one can avoid two particular problems associated with trying
to defend reparations on the individual level. The first is the non-identity problem, and the
second is the challenge of identifying which parties have claims to reparations.2 I will also
attempt to respond to critics who are critical of such group-based approaches. Jan Narveson for
instance is critical of the notion of group responsibility, and argues that group, or collective
responsibility, ultimately reduces to the responsibilities of individuals.
To show that it is possible to justify a group-based claim to reparations for slavery, I will
rely on Larry May’s account of groups. According to May, groups are individuals in relations.
More specifically, these relations structure individuals’ actions, interests and intentions.
Appealing to a group-based account of reparations, I argue, can help avoid some issues that
surround attempts to justify reparations on the individual level. As a group, African-Americans
are worse off socially, politically and economically than white Americans. On average, AfricanAmericans are less educated, poorer and more likely to be incarcerated. While I will not be able
to establish the claim here, my argument assumes that, as some suggest, the inequality that exists

2

Kukathas also argues that in order to justify reparations, one needs to identify two agents: the agent responsible for
the injustice, and the victim of the injustice. And so, a complete defense of reparations for slavery must include both
a defense of a group-based approach when it comes to responsibility and harm. However, my paper will focus only
on the harm aspect. That is, my paper will focus on a defense of a group-based approach to claims for reparations for
slavery by the group who has been harmed as a result of the injustice. While I will touch on issues of responsibility
as it applies to the critique of Jan Narveson in section 3.3, questions of group-based responsibility are outside of the
scope of this paper.
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between these two groups (the systematic discrimination and disadvantaging of AfricanAmericans) likely has its roots in both the injustices of slavery as well as the failure to repair for
these injustices. Because there have been few (if any) substantial attempts to repair the injustice
of slavery, this particular injustice has endured into the present (and will likely continue to
endure until attempts are made at repair).
However, while I aim to demonstrate how my group-based approach can avoid some
issues that arise when trying to justify reparations on the individual level, issues arise when
trying to defend the idea that groups can make moral claims. As some argue, only individual
persons can have and make moral claims, while groups, properly speaking, can do neither. To
say that a group has a moral claim, according to some critics, requires that we posit an entity
above and beyond the individuals that make up the group.3 To posit such an entity however,
requires metaphysical speculations that are difficult, if not impossible to prove. Other critics
maintain that, a group’s moral claim is merely the aggregation of the moral claims of the
individuals that make up the group.4 In defending my group-based approach to reparations, I will
also demonstrate how May’s account of groups also avoids worries from both sides of the issue
surrounding groups and moral claims. While May’s account of groups does not require the
positing of a metaphysical entity above and beyond the individuals that make up the group,
May’s account can also make sense of how group-based claims are not merely the aggregation of
individuals’ claims.

3

Graff (1994), for example, argues in order to say that a group has moral claims is to subscribe claims to a fictitious
entity. Vincent (1989) also raises worries for positing a group status that is independent of the status of its group
members.
4
For example, Narveson (2002), whose position will be explored in more detail, offers this position in his article
“Collective Responsibility.” Other authors such as Wellman (1995) and Griffin (2003) also argue that groups do not
have moral standing that does not reduce to the moral standing of their individual members.
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In Section I of my paper, I will examine the critiques as put forth by the critics I mention
above. I will examine Kukathas’ critique as it relates to identifying the relevant agents regarding
claims to reparations for historic injustices. I will then examine Perez’s issues with justifying
reparations claims for historic injustices, namely the non-identity problem. Finally, I will turn to
Narveson’s critique concerning group-based notions, such as collective responsibility and
collective harm. In Section II, I will examine May’s account of groups. Specifically, I will show
how May’s account can be thought of as middle position between those who think groups have
no moral claims, and those who think that groups can have moral claims independently of the
individual members that make up the group. In Section III, I will attempt to demonstrate how
May’s account can respond to the challenges raised by the critics discussed in Section I. Finally,
in Section IV, I will consider and respond to some objections that one may pose to my account.

2
2.1

CRITICS

Chandran Kukathas and the Problem of Agency
In his article “Who? Whom? Reparations and the Problem of Agency,” Kukathas

explains that claims to reparation are a special type of claim. Unlike claims of distributive
justice, the claims put forth are not that claims regarding an unfairly structured institution. Rather
the claims are “that particular wrongs were committed and that it is the further injustices that
were consequent upon them that need to be rectified” (Kukathas 2006, 332). When one makes a
claim to reparations, one claims that she has been wronged by another. As a result of the harms
suffered, one is due reparation. Or as Bernard Boxill puts it, one has a right to reparation when
one has been harmed as a result of another’s transgression (Boxill 2003).
Because of the specific nature of reparative claims, Kukathas argues that the justification
of such claims relies on one’s ability to identify two types of agents. In order to justify claims to
4

reparations, one must be able to identify both the agent to whom reparation is due (the victim of
the wrongdoing), as well as the agent who owes reparation (the perpetrator or transgressor who
committed the wrong). Kukathas writes,
When the issue is one of justice in restitution, identifying those who are to be held
liable or entitled to compensations is crucial, because the question is not simply
one of how the benefits and burdens should be distributed in a good society, but
rather a question of who owes what to whom…. (Kukathas 2006, 332)
In his analysis, Kukathas examines which types of agents are relevant in issues of
reparative justice. Kukathas notes that there are two types of agents that “can make, or be asked
to fulfill moral claims” (Kukathas 2006, 332). These include individuals and groups. Group
agents include (among others) families, tribes, companies, and governments. So then, when
dealing with issues of rectification, claims to reparation can be made by either individuals or
groups against either another individual or group.
Take the following example. Gladys steals Mark’s bicycle. In this case, one individual
(Gladys) has wronged another individual (Mark) by stealing his bike. Mark then has a claim to
reparation against Gladys. Put another way, Gladys owes reparations to Mark. Given that one
can identify both the agent who has been wronged, as well as the agent responsible for the
wrongdoing, reparations (or, at least some sort of compensatory justice) can be justified in this
case.5 However, Kukathas cautions that while it might be easy to identify the relevant agents in
such cases, establishing the extent of responsibility and entitlement “can get progressively more
difficult…as time goes on” (Kukathas 2006, 334). Let’s say Gladys and Mark die and several
generations pass. Imagine also that Gladys never returned the bike to Mark, and as such, the bike
has been passed down to Gladys’ great granddaughter. Does Mark’s great grandson have a claim
against Gladys’ great granddaughter?
Of course, this is a low-stakes case, as stealing another’s bike (in many cases) does not count as a serious
transgression or harm. At the very least however, Mark has a claim against Gladys that she return Mark’s bike.
5
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Assuming that descendants of victims of past injustices can rightfully claim reparations,
one must then identify the individuals who are the descendants of victims of past injustices.6
However, Kukathas cautions that, depending on who counts as a descendant of a past injustice,
this could include a “worryingly large number” of people: “It would be a very large number if
we considered anyone a descendant of a victim if he or she could identify any ancestor who had
suffered injustice” (Kukathas 2006, 335). Additionally, one encounters trouble when dealing
with individuals that have a mixed ancestry, such that one is both a descendant of a victim of a
past injustice, as well as a descendant of a perpetrator of the injustice.
Given the difficulties that exist when attempting to identify individual descendants of
victims of past injustices, one might suggest looking to groups as candidates for reparations.
Kukathas also recognizes the advantage of doing so. Identifying groups, he writes, give us,
“An entity that is easier to isolate and distinguish from other potential claimants because it has
persisted over a greater length of time and because tracing an ancestry will not be a problem.
Moreover, the most serious injustices of the past, which cry out for rectifications, were
committed against groups or people as members of groups.” (Kukathas 2006, 336)
However, despite the appeal of looking to groups as candidates for reparations, Kukathas
raises similar problems to the ones raised when attempting to identify individual descendants.
First, it is important to identify which groups count as candidates for reparations. While one
might argue that African-Americans as a group are descendants of victims of past injustice, one
must also justify the exclusion of other groups that are also descendants of victims of injustice.
Given that the histories of many groups include subjection to severe injustices, one would need

6

While this is a big assumption to make, this is an assumption that Kukathas makes in order to set the stage for his
criticism. His point here is that, even if we can, in some way, justify that descendants of victims can make claims to
reparations (which he would probably ultimately deny), we’re still left with the issues of identifying the harmed
parties and the responsible parties. This then is the problem he lays out in the rest of his paper.

6

to determine which groups are entitled to reparations claims, as well as why these groups and not
others are entitled to such claims. Without some justification, nearly all groups with histories of
facing injustices would be entitled to reparations. Given the fact that many groups have such
histories, this would result in a “worryingly large number” of groups receiving reparations.
Additionally, one must determine who ought to be counted as a member of the group in question.
Considering the complex histories and identities of groups and their subgroups, this makes
identifying who counts as a member of the group in question difficult. Such groups might have
committed injustices themselves and individual members of such groups might be of mixed
descent (Kukathas 2006, 337).
2.2

Nahshon Perez and the Non-Identity Problem
In Freedom from Past Injustice, Nahshon Perez is critical of our ability to justify

reparation for historic injustices. Indeed, in the conclusion of his book, Perez discusses the right
to a “clean slate” (Perez 2012, 137). Here, Perez argues that the descendants of the wrongdoers
have no relation to the historic injustice, and so those that were born after the injustice do not
have an obligation to offer reparations (Perez 2012). Moreover, the descendants of the victims
who were wronged as a result of the injustice, have no relation to the injustice (or perhaps, are
related in such a way that makes it incredibly problematic to justify claims) and so have no claim
to reparations themselves.
In his book, Perez discusses many difficulties that arise when trying to justify reparations
for historic injustices. Given these problems, Perez argues that justifying the reparations for
historic injustices is, if not impossible, incredibly difficult. One of the difficulties that arise when
trying to justify reparations for historic injustices is the non-identity problem. The non-identity
problem, according the Perez, is such that, while we can say that those who were directly
7

wronged as a result of the injustice are harmed, we cannot extend the notion of harm to include
the descendants of the original victims. In other words, descendants of the original victims
cannot be harmed by the original injustice (Perez 2012).
To explain the challenge of the non-identity problem, Perez begins with the assumption
that existence is better than non-existence (Perez 2012).7 It follows then, that, if one’s existence
is causally connected with, or determined by some event, that event did not harm that person.
Indeed, had the event not occurred, that person would not exist. It follows then that the event in
question, given it is necessarily tied to one’s existence, did not make one worse off (Perez 2012).
And if the event did not make a person worse off, then it seems that person can have no claim for
damages against persons responsible for it.
To explain this problem more concretely, take for example the injustice of slavery. In the
case of slavery, given that the descendants of the original victims would not exist had the
injustice of slavery not occurred, the descendants of the original victims (that is, living AfricanAmericans) are not harmed by the original injustice. Assuming that harm is a necessary
condition for reparations, given that living African-Americans are not harmed by slavery, living
African-Americans have no claim to reparations for the injustice. Here it might be important to
note that the non-identity problem concerns particular individuals. While it is possible that, had
the injustice of slavery not occurred, there may be African-Americans currently living in the
United States, these individuals would not be the same individuals who currently exist.
While discussing the non-identity problem, Perez also discusses two tactics philosophers
have taken in trying to overcome the non-identity problem: the identity solution and the timing

7

While Perez takes this as non-controversial, some philosophers hold the opposing view. For instance, David
Benatar in his book Better to Have Never Been argues that coming into existence is actually a significant harm.

8

solution (Perez 2012).8 The identity solution, according to Perez, attempts to overcome the nonidentity problem in the following way: Groups can have “intergenerational identities.” (Perez
2012, 27) That is, groups can share characteristics that span over generations--characteristics
such as a common culture, language, religion and history. Given that this identity is
intergenerational, a group identity can precede a past wrong and endure beyond it. That is, in
instances in which a group was harmed, it is possible that the group’s identity existed prior to the
injustice and that the group remains identifiable both prior to and after the injustice (Perez 2012).
Groups with an intergenerational identity, Perez explains, can be harmed in ways that not
only harm the individual members as individuals but also harm the identity of the group (Perez
2012). Given that identity as a group member may be essential to the identity of the individuals
in the group, historic injustices, by harming the identity of the group, also harm the identity of
the individual group members. Perez writes, “Such current harms may include emotional
distress, the feelings of insult and humiliation that current members of the group feel (….)”
(Perez 2012, 28). Proponents of the identity solution, according to Perez argue that in some
instances of such group harm, “the ability of the group’s current members to function in their
respective societies is harmed as a result of this identification with the victims of the past wrong”
(Perez 2012, 28). Given that groups and their current members can be harmed in such ways,
proponents of the identity solution argue that it is indeed possible to justify claims to rectification
on the behalf of descendants of a historic injustice.
While the identity solution attempts to overcome the non-identity problem, Perez
suggests that solution has problems of its own. Perez’s main criticism of the identity solution is
that, the solution only works if the current identity of the group is the same as the identity of the
group when the group suffered the injustice. Otherwise, it is not possible to say that the group
8

This paper will focus on the former of the two solutions.

9

that currently exists (and the group’s current members) is harmed as a result of the historic
injustice (Perez 2012). Given the fact that group identity is fluid, rather than static, it is not likely
that the identities of group are ever the same over a number of generations. Moreover, in cases in
which a group suffers an injustice, it seems likely that the injustice will alter the identity of the
group in some significant way. And in cases in which the identity of a group chances over time,
the group that currently exists is a different group (Perez 2012). And if the group that currently
exists is a different group from the one that suffered the injustice, then the currently existing
members cannot claim rectification for the injustice. In instances in which the group’s identity
changes, the identity solution is unable to overcome the non-identity problem (Perez 2012).
2.3

Jan Narveson and Problems with Group Responsibility
The next critic I will examine is Jan Narveson. Narveson’s critique takes a slightly

different approach than the approaches of the authors examined above. While the positions I
examined above focus on justifying reparations, Narveson focuses on the group-based approach I
wish to take in overcoming the difficulties raised by the other authors. Specifically, Narveson is
critical of the notion that we can hold collectives or groups responsible for making reparations.
And while Narveson’s position focuses on the responsibility side of reparations, I will later
demonstrate how his critique has implications for notions of group-based accounts of harm.
In his article, “Collective Responsibility,” Naverson argues that collective responsibility
is ultimately explained by and attributable to the responsibility of individuals. Any action that
one recognizes as a ‘collective action’ is ultimately the aggregation of individual action
(Narveson 2002). It follows then that any responsibility tied to such action is ultimately the

10

responsibility of individuals. In other words, ‘collectives’ cannot be responsible for the actions of
individuals (Narveson 2002).9
In his analysis, Narveson examines two types of collective action. The distinction
between the two kinds of actions hinges on whether or not each individual’s action could take
place, even if the rest of the group did not exist. For example, imagine fifty people raising their
hand at a certain time. Each of the fifty individuals could have raised their hands at that specific
time, even if the other 49 individuals did not exist (Narveson 2002). On the other hand, if we
imagine the actions of players in a sporting game, each individual player is able to act, say score
a goal, block, tackle, etc, because there are others playing the game. These individuals are acting
within the context of a collective (Narveson 2002). They are playing a game that is structured by
rules that enable us to apply terms such as scoring, blocking, etc. While Narveson acknowledges
that in these sorts of actions, membership in collectives has some causal role in an individual’s
action, it is individuals who ultimately decide how to act (Narveson 2002).
For these reasons, Narveson argues that we ought to reject the notion of collective
responsibility, that is, the notion that collectives are “irreducibly responsible” for their actions.
Using genocide as an example, Narveson takes aim at those who argue that some actions are
irreducibly collective. In the case of genocide, Narveson argues that even if all those who are
killed belong to one particular group, and all those who did the killing belong to another group,
genocide is not irreducibly collective (Narveson 2002). That is, genocide is an action that can be
reduced to individual actions. And given that it is possible to reduce this kind of collective action
to the actions of individuals, Narveson argues that this allows us to hold the individuals who
acted responsible (Narveson 2002). Maintaining that responsibility for some collective action is

9

It seems to me that Narveson, while discussing collective responsibility, is actually conflating two notions of
responsibility, namely guilt and liability. I discuss this conflation in greater detail in section 3.3.
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irreducible, raises difficulties with doing just this. Narveson argues that the most significant
problem for those who want to argue that genocide is irreducible, is that it becomes difficult, if
not impossible to hold individuals responsible. And if individuals are not responsible, then
individuals cannot be punished (Narveson 2002).
While Narveson’s critique focuses on collective or group responsibility, his critique has
interesting implications for notions of group-based harm. Most central to Narveson’s analysis is
the idea that individuals are fundamental, and so, any moral predicate that one applies to a
collective ultimately applies to the individuals that make up such collectives. To say then that,
African-Americans, as a group, have a claim to reparations for slavery, is to say that, ultimately,
this group-based claim is ultimately the aggregation of the claims to reparations of individual
African-Americans. And so, even if one were to (for the sake of brevity, perhaps) call the claim
to reparations for slavery a “group-based claim,” in reality, such a claim amounts merely to an
aggregation of individuals’ claims to reparations (and so, is not a group-based claim in any
interesting way). And while offering a group-based approach is intended to avoid some of the
criticisms surrounding justifying claims to reparations on the individual level, such an approach,
ultimately, is subject to the same criticisms.
In this section, I have examined some of the most important criticisms surrounding
attempts to justify claims to reparations. Specifically, I have examined the criticisms of
Kukathas, Perez and Narveson. As I suggested earlier, it is my position that, by appealing to a
group-based approach to reparations, one can avoid some of the criticisms discussed in Section I.
In the following section, I will examine Larry May’s account of groups; an account that I take to
be a plausible candidate for justifying reparations on a group level. My analysis here will focus
on how May’s account can be thought of as a middle position between those who argue that

12

groups (and any predicate we apply to groups) are merely aggregations of the individuals who
compose the group, and those who are argue that groups (and any predicate we apply to groups)
can be independent of the individuals who compose the group. In Section III, I will examine how
May’s account is able to avoid the criticisms outlined in Section I.

3

MAY’S APPROACH

In order to defend the position that groups can have and make moral claims (claims to
reparations, specifically), I turn to Larry May’s account of groups.10 In The Morality of Groups,
May argues that the structure of social groups “plays such an important role in the acts,
intentions, and interests of members of groups, that social groups should be given a moral status
different from that of the discrete individual persons who compose them” (May 1987, 3). In his
book, May attempts to defend what he calls a “middle position”. On the one hand, May’s middle
position is opposed to the view that the moral status of social groups is not distinct from the
aggregate moral standing of the individual members of the group.11 On this view, groups
themselves do not have moral standing; only the individuals who compose the group have moral
standing. On the other hand, May’s position is also opposed to the view that the moral standing
of groups is entirely separate from the moral standing of the individual members.12 According to
May, the relationships between members of a social group are distinct from those relationships
that exist between members outside of the social group, and as such, social groups ought to be
given a different moral status than simply a moral status that reflects the aggregation of the
individual members’ moral standing. However, because the relationships are between the
While I rely on May’s articulation of his account in May (1987), his account of groups, as it pertains to my thesis
remains largely unchanged. For example, see Chapter 2 in Genocide (May 2010) for a more recent articulation of
May’s account of groups and group harm.
11
Throughout this section, I will refer to this view as the “group-as-aggregates” view.
12
Throughout this section, I will refer to this view as the “groups-as-full moral agents” view.
10
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members of the group, the moral standing of the relationships themselves is not entirely separate
from the moral standing of the individual members.
In the first chapter of his book, May discusses the nature of social groups. It is here that
May defends his middle position against both the groups-as-aggregates view, and the groups-asfull moral agents view. As an example of the groups-as-aggregates view, May examines Lon
Fuller’s view that social groups exist only as creations of the legal imagination (May 1987).
According to Fuller, while it is reasonable to call a collection of individuals a ‘group’ because
there is a unity to the collection, this unity is mistakenly believed to resemble the unity of a
person. According to Fuller, unity is “always a matter of subjective convenience” (May 1987,
11). For example, one may, for the sake of convenience, refer to a collection of hams hanging in
a butcher shop as a unit. However, it is clear that the unity among the collection is not the same
as the unity that is attributed to each of the individual hams.13 Similarly, the unity attributed to
groups of individuals is not the same as that which is attributed to the individuals themselves
(May 1987).
It seems here that worries concerning unity are in some sense related to concerns
surrounding identity. So when one talks about the “unity” of some entity, one is talking about, in
some sense, what makes the entity the same entity over time. This might help make sense of the
The hams hanging in a butcher shop example is Fuller’s, not mine. For reasons surrounding Quinean concerns,
one might reject the example, because hams are not natural kinds, and as such, we cannot assign references to them.
According to Quine, we can assign references to only those entities for we have a clear identity criterion. Assigning
references to an entity then, requires that one be able to identify the entity over time and under different
circumstances. For this reason, it might make sense to say that only “natural kinds” are the kinds of things that can
have references. Natural kinds are kinds that are individuated by some underlying structure. If hams are not a natural
kind, then it seems that the example could be easily replaced with a similar example involving some natural kind.
The more pressing problem however, is whether groups are natural kinds such that we assign references to them.
May’s conception of groups might allow us to make sense of this particular problem. When we say that Gulf Oil
Company left Pittsburgh, this statement refers to “an organizational structure whereby several persons, who are
members of Gulf Oil Company, are designated as those who will decide where all of the members will work” (May
1987, 12). According to May, the use of this statement can be justified “by reference to the decision structure which
related and partially transformed the actions of individual board members and employees of this corporation” (May
1987, 12-3). Our reference then does not apply to a group per se, rather the reference applies to the organizational
structure.
13
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distinction between individual/group unity. That is, Fuller’s assertion that the unity of an
individual entity is distinct from the unity of a set or collection of entities. And while there is a
unity to individuals such that we can say that some person is the same person at both times x and
y, this does not (for the most part) hold for groups.
It seems that for Fuller and other proponents of the groups-as-aggregates view, it very
unlikely that groups can have identities, such that we would be warranted in saying that a certain
group at time x is the same group that existed at time y. Given that groups are merely aggregates
of the individuals who compose them, if the aggregations changes (that is, if the membership
changes), then the group itself changes. And though groups are merely an aggregation of the
individuals who compose them, for purposes of convenience, we can treat a particular
aggregation of persons as a unit, for example some corporation X, even though the aggregation is
continuously changing.
Contra Fuller, May argues that Fuller’s analysis fails to take into account the different
types of unity among collections. According to May, one significant difference between types of
unity is the impact that such unity can have on the individuals in a particular group (May 1987).
So while the fact that the location of one ham does not impact the capabilities of another, in other
sorts of units, “the fact that one member stands in a certain relationship to other members does
make a difference in terms of what that person can accomplish” (May 1987, 12). If we think of
this in terms of identity, then the fact that one identifies the collection of hams as group (the
collection of hams has an identity as a group), does not affect the capabilities of the individual
hams. However, by identifying a collection of individuals as a group, this can affect (as I will
discuss below) the capabilities or interests of the individuals that compose the group.
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After examining the issues surrounding the groups-as-aggregates view, May examines
both the position of Emile Durkheim (who May takes to be one of the chief defenders of the
groups-as-full moral agents view) as well as the position of Peter French. According to
Durkheim, individuals cannot help but being influenced by the traditions and collective beliefs
(embodied in the moral customs and laws of societies) of previous generations. According to
Durkheim, such collective beliefs, as well as their influence on individuals, are independent of
the beliefs and influence of contemporary individuals (May 1987). And because these social
forces begin to influence individuals at such an early age, the influence becomes beyond the
control of individuals (May 1987). Moreover, while collective beliefs and traditions are passed
on to succeeding generations by individuals, specific individuals cannot change either the beliefs
or the traditions (May 1987).
According to Durkheim, the collective beliefs and traditions of a social group are so
deeply embedded in the psychologies of the groups’ members that such social groups come to
“have a life of their own” (May 1987, 19). In other words, such social groups become irreducible
and independently real in their own right (May 1987). While May agrees that social traditions
and relationships among group members have a reality that is different from the reality of
individuals, May argues that these relationships are not entirely separate from the individuals in
the relationship and as such, it is not sufficient to establish that groups have an independent
reality (May 1987).14
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According to Durkheim, social facts exist internal to and external to individuals. For this reason, it would be
incorrect to say that social facts exist independently of all individuals. His claim seems to be more modest in that
these social facts exist independently of any particular individual. Methodologically, in order to properly study such
facts, one needs to abstract these facts from the individuals through which they are realized. On this account, it
seems that the notion of social groups is a social fact; it’s a fact of our social life that individuals form and identify
with particular social groups. So then, while groups exist independently of any particular individual member, it is
not the case that the group exists independently of all its members. It also seems that Durkheim would maintain that
the relations among groups are a social fact, such that these relations exist independently of any particular
individual; though it is not the case that such relations exist independently of all individuals. If the above portrayal
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May also examines Peter French’s views, which he classifies as an example of the
groups-as-full moral agents view.15 French distinguishes between two types of social groups:
aggregate collectivities and conglomerate collectivities. According to French, aggregate
collectivities are merely collections of people, such that the group’s identity is dependent on the
membership of the aggregate; a change in the membership of the aggregates changes the identity
of the aggregate (May 1987). According to French, this sort of collective is subject to a reductive
analysis; it can be understood as merely an aggregate of the members who compose the group.
Thus, according to May this sort of group can be easily handled by methodological
individualists.16 On the other hand, unlike the identity of aggregate collectivities, the identity of
conglomerate collectives is not dependant on the membership of its members; a change in the
membership of a conglomerate collectivity does not entail a change in the identity of the group
(May 1987). Given that such a group cannot be understood as merely an aggregation or
summation of the members who compose it, this sort of group cannot be easily handled by
methodological individualists. While May finds this distinction useful, he offers a friendly
amendment to French’s position.
In making this amendment, May notes French’s distinction between the two types of
aggregate collectivities. On the one hand, random aggregate collectivities include individuals
who just happen to in the same place as the same time. Individuals waiting for the bus at a bus
stop fall into this category. On the other hand, there are aggregates that are more appropriately
of Durkheim’s view is correct, the distinction between his view and May’s view becomes less clear. Perhaps the
distinction is one of methodology. While Durkheim suggests that, in order to properly study social facts, such as
relations between group members, we ought to abstract from the individuals through whom social facts are realized,
however, May argues that such social facts are not entirely separate from the individuals through whom these facts
are realized. Given that the relationships among group members exist between members, we ought not to abstract
from the individuals in these relationships. See Chapter 1 in May (1987) for his discussion of Durkheim’s view.
15
While the term used here is mine, and not May’s, May does classify French’s position in the way that I have
suggested here. That is, as a position that maintains that groups themselves can have moral standing in the same way
that individuals can.
16
That is, those who hold the view that all social phenomena can be explained and reduced entirely to individuals.
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defined in terms of a shared feature or characteristic. Such aggregates include mobs and teams
(May 1987). According to May, this second class of aggregates cannot be adequately understood
as a mere aggregation of its members. May suggests that the structure of the group allows its
members to either engage in joint action, or to have common interests (May 1987). So while
French’s position is focused on fixed membership as a criterion for distinguishing types of social
groups, May amends French’s position to suggest that the structure of a group is what
distinguishes types of social groups.
It seems that, on May’s account, difference in (organizational) structure always
distinguishes the different types of social groups. It seems that most fundamentally, there are two
classes of collectives on May’s account: Aggregations (whose moral status would be reduced to
the moral status of the individuals who make up the aggregation) and groups (whose moral status
does not reduce merely to the moral status of the individuals who make up the group).17 In the
case of an aggregation, the aggregation is structured such that the individuals who make up this
collective do not have common interests. More specifically, while the individuals may have the
same interest, it is not an interest they hold in virtue of being a member of the aggregation. All of
the individuals waiting for the bus, for example, might share the same interest: that the bus
arrives on time. But this interest is one that each individual holds as an individual, and not an
interest they hold in virtue of being a member of a particular collective. And for any collective
that does not have common interests (and not merely the same shared interest), it is not a group
in any morally relevant sense. According to May, the relations between the members of a group
ought to be the focus of our analysis of groups. These relationships, May suggests, have an
17

Groups then are distinguished based on differences in organizational structure. Moreover, differences in
organizational structure (typically) correspond to whether the group is based on voluntary or involuntary group
membership. Groups based on voluntary membership are typically much more organized than groups based on
involuntary membership. How the members of these two types of groups are harmed is discussed later in this
section.
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ontological status that is distinct from the ontological status of the group’s individual members
(May 1987). According to May, these social relationships “have a reality in that they structure or
unify a group of individual human persons so that these persons can act and have interests in
different ways than they could on their own…. [T]he relationships themselves are not reducible
to psychological, or other, features of individual human persons” (May 1987, 23). However,
while these relationships are not reducible to individual members, they are not entirely separate
from the individual members.18 As such, any analysis one gives of these relationships can
abstract from neither the group nor its individual members.
After discussing the reasons for rejecting both the groups-as-aggregates view, and the
groups-as-full moral agents view, May then offers his middle position. As previously suggested,
May argues that relations among groups and their members ought to be the focus of our analysis
when it comes to groups (May 1987). Moreover, May puts emphasis on how these relations are
manifested by their effects. Specifically, May is concerned with how the structure of, or the
relations among members, enables group members to perform actions or have interests that they
could not on their own (May 1987). According to May, the moral status of social groups is
grounded in the relations among group members. That is, a group has a moral status insofar as
these relations allow collections of persons to either engage in joint action or to have common
interests (May 1987). This is the key characteristic of social groups. Furthermore, in order to
either engage in joint action or to have common interests, it needs neither be the case that, 1) The
Here it might be important to note what May has in mind by a group being “irreducible.” Given that May’s
analysis is concerned with a group’s moral status, it seems to me that by being irreducible, a group’s moral status is
not merely the aggregation of the moral statuses of all the individual members of the group. An (overly simplistic)
example here might be helpful. Imagine that Garima and Sophie are the members of a group with an irreducible
moral status. This means that the moral status of this group is not merely Garima’s individual moral status, plus
Sophie’s individual moral status. While the moral status of this group is not independent of the moral status of its
two members, its moral status is also not identical merely to the aggregation of the individuals’ interests either.
Moreover, by trying to reduce the moral status of a group to merely an aggregation of its individual members, an
analysis we attempt to give of the actions, intentions, or interests of the group will be lacking. Fully explaining some
interests require making reference to the relations among individuals.
18
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group is organized in such a way such that there is a decision-making procedure; nor 2) The
membership of the group is fixed, that is, the members of the group remain constant (May
1987).
According to May, in order for a collection of persons to be considered a social group,
the relations among the members of the collection must be structured such that the members
must be capable of either acting collectively or having collective interests. Here then, it is
important to flesh out May’s discussion of group interests and harms to groups. May has in mind
here is relying on a fairly common definition of harm; harm is a setback to one’s interest (May
1987). It follows then, that a collection of individuals can be harmed only if the relations among
the members allow the individuals to have collective or group-based interests. In order to
coherently say that some group has been harmed, that is, that the group’s interest has been set
back, the group must first be capable of having some interest. It’s important to emphasize here
that May is not arguing that the groups themselves can have interests independently of the
members of the group. A group only has interests because it is composed on individuals who are
related to one another. However, group-based interests are interests that individuals cannot have
on their own. Such interests are interests individuals can have only in virtue of being related to
others as members of a group. 19 Each member of the group has an interest, not in virtue of being
individual, but in virtue of being a member of a group.20 Group interests are, according to May
best understood as a group-based concept, because, such interests cannot be fully explained
without reference to a social group, its structure, or the relations among members.
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Below, I discuss discriminatory stereotyping as an example of a group-based harm. Having an interest in not
having such harmful treatment attached to group membership is an interest one can only have as a member of a
group.
20
However, it is important to note that such group-based interests are not merely an aggregation of the interests of
each individual member.
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Furthermore, according to May, in order for a group to have an interest, it need not be the
case that the group is capable of collective action. It need not be the case that the group is
organized in such a way such that the group has some sort of a decision-making procedure such
that it can engage in collective action (May 1987). As May suggests, being capable of collective
action is not necessary to ground the moral status of groups, because groups can be acted upon
(May 1987). That is, members of groups can be harmed by the actions of others. Given that harm
here refers to a setback of one’s interests, susceptibility to harm presupposes that one is capable
of having interests. So long as a collection of persons can have been harmed, that is, so long as it
is capable of bearing interests, then this collection ought to be considered a social group and
ought to be given moral standing. May writes,
But given that having an interest does not require complex organizational
structure, decision-making procedure, or even the capacity for action, it will turn
out that a wide range of social groups can be harmed, and should be recognized as
having at least some form of standing to make legitimate moral or legal claims.
(May 1987, 113)
Having an interest is typically thought to justify one’s ability to assert a claim. So then, if a
collection of persons indeed is related such that the members can have a collective interest, then
this collection, or group of persons are in a position to justifiably assert a claim. Such claims can
include claims for redress in the event of some harmful treatment (May 1987).
While May argues that a group can be harmed only if it is capable of having interests,
May also argues that a group can have collective interests only if there is enough coherence to
the group, such that the group can have an “identifiable status” (May 1987, 115). May seems to
suggest that groups can have an identifiable status either internally, that is, the members of the
group feel a sense of solidarity with one another, or externally, that is, outsiders identify the
members of the group as belonging to the group (May 1987). May writes,

21

Either solidarity characterizes the feelings of the members toward each other,
thereby creating empathetic reactions of all to the harm of some members, or
indiscriminate treatment of individual person as group members by outsiders
creates a risk of similar treatment of all members of a group. (May 1987, 115)
Regardless of whether a group is internally or externally coherent, May suggests that when one
member of the group is directly harmed, all other members of the group are also harmed, albeit,
indirectly or vicariously (May 1987). That is, their interests are not set back directly by whatever
was the cause of the directly harmed group member. Rather, their interests are set back
indirectly. To understand how interests can be set back indirectly, it might be helpful to look at
examples of the indirect set back of the interests of group members in both internally and
externally coherent groups.
If the group is internally coherent, and if one member of the group is directly harmed,
then other members of the group will be indirectly or vicariously harmed because they strongly
empathize with the member who was directly harmed. An example of this sort of harm might
include harms done to family members. Given that the interests of an individual is intimately tied
with the interests of her son or daughter (the interests of her son or the interests of her daughter
are, in some sense, her interests), this person’s interests are indirectly set back when her son or
daughter is directly harmed.
On the other hand, if the group is externally coherent, and if a member is directly harmed,
then other members are harmed indirectly in that the harmful treatment could just as easily have
been directed at any of the other members (May 1987). In some cases, individuals are harmed as
a result of being treated, not as an individual, but as a member of a group. An example of this
type of harm is mistreatment due to stereotyping. When one is a victim of stereotyping, the
treatment that one faces is not a result of anything particular about one as an individual. Rather,
one is suffering such treatment because one is being regarded as a member of a particular group.
22

Given that one is being harmed qua group member, any other member of the group could have
just as easily been a victim of the mistreatment.21 For example, if a job candidate Susanne is not
selected by a potential employer solely on account of her membership in a particular group, then,
for any other members of the group, were one to have applied for the same job, one would also
have suffered the same mistreatment. May writes, “The individuals not directly affected can be
said to be indirectly or vicariously harmed in that their status is adversely affected by what has
occurred to their fellow members” (May 1987, 115).
Furthermore, May argues this type of harm is a group-based harm because “it is not
reducible to the aggregate harms and claims of the individual members of the group” (May
1987). In other words, in order to properly explain the harm faced by some member, one must
make reference to some social group, or one of its features. In the case of Susanne, in order to
properly explain her mistreatment, one must make reference to her membership in a particular
group. If Susanne is not selected because she is (identified by the employer as) African
American, then Susanne is not an African American who happens to be a victim of mistreatment.
Rather, Susanne faces mistreatment because she is African American. The constitutive features
of her identity as an individual are irrelevant to her mistreatment; her membership in a particular
group is the only characteristic that is being treated as important. In this case, Susanne is being
reduced to a token of the type “African American” (May 1987, 116). So then, in order to
properly explain Susanne’s mistreatment, one must make reference to her membership in a
particular social group.
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Of course, if a particular case of mistreatment due to stereotyping of one group member occurs in Denver, then
clearly another group member that is in Pittsburgh at the time that the stereotyping take place could not have just as
easily been a victim of this particular instance of stereotyping. So time and location will obviously play some role in
constraining which members are more and less likely to experience this indirect harm.
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Adverse stereotyping of this sort gives rise to a group’s collective interest in not having
such mistreatment attached to (perceived) group membership. Again, the interest a collection of
individuals have in not having mistreatment attached to group membership is only properly
explained by making reference to a particular social group or one of its features. For this reason,
this sort of interest is a groups-based or collective interest. And if a collection of individuals can
have a collective interest, then this is sufficient to say that the collection is a social group, and as
such, can have moral standing.22
In the case of reparations for slavery, being subjected to the sorts of discrimination
examined above might plausibly be said to be among the sources of the unequal status of
African-Americans. Such discrimination might be said to be the cause of the fact that, as a
group, African-Americans are worse off socially, politically and economically than white
Americans. Such discrimination might explain why, on average, African-Americans are less
educated, poorer and more likely to be incarcerated. Moreover, if such discrimination, as some
social scientists have suggested, has its roots in slavery, Jim Crow segregation, as well as the
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While all groups that can have collective interests have moral standing, May makes an interesting distinction
between harms to corporate groups, and harms to ethnic or minority groups. These groups are importantly distinct in
two ways. The first distinction surrounds the voluntariness of membership. While one chooses to join a corporation,
one does not choose to be born into a particular ethnic or minority group. So then, one’s identity is bound up in
being members of an ethnic or a minority group in ways that the identities of individuals in corporate groups are
typically not. While one can cease to be a member of a corporation, it seems that one cannot cease being African
American. Secondly, ethnic and minority groups are not strongly organized, while corporations are highly
organized. Given its complex organizational structure, when a corporation is harmed, there are procedures in place
such that some individuals are harmed more directly than others. In unorganized groups, when the group is harmed,
all members are harmed. Again, take the example mistreatment due to stereotyping. All members are of a group are
harmed (either directly or indirectly) by stereotyping. That is, all members are indiscriminately perceived in terms of
some unfavorable characteristics, and as such, are all just as likely to be harmed as are those members that are
directly harmed. Again, while both voluntary and involuntary groups have moral standing on May’s account,
because groups based on involuntary membership are less organized than voluntary groups, they ought to be
afforded more protections than groups based on voluntary membership. What seems to be playing the normative role
here in how we afford protections to groups is harm, and choice. Groups based on involuntary membership are not
afforded more protections because they did not choose to be a member of the group. Rather, such groups are given a
afforded more protections because such groups lack a complex organizational structure to distribute the harms that
the group faces. See Chapter 6 “Harming Groups” in May’s book for a more in depth discussion of ways different
types of social groups can be harmed, and the protections that ought to be afforded to them based on these
differences.
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failure to make substantial attempts at reparations for these injustices, then the group-based harm
suffered by African-Americans today is (at least partially) causally linked with these injustices.23
And if such injustices indeed can be plausibly linked to the harms suffered by AfricanAmericans today, then it seems that by being subjected to such harms, African-Americans, as a
group, can make a claim to reparations for these historic injustices. Again, while the harms
suffered and the claims to reparations, are ultimately faced by and belong to individuals, given
that neither the harm nor the claims to reparations can be properly explained without reference to
some social group, both the harm and the claims to reparations are best conceptualized as groupbased. In this section, I have explained Larry May’s account of groups. Specifically, I attempted
to elucidate how May’s account can be thought of as a middle position between those who
endorse a group-as-aggregates view, and a group-as-full moral agent’s view. Moreover, I have
attempted to elucidate how May’s account can make sense of a group-based account of
reparations for slavery. In the following section, I will attempt to demonstrate how May’s
account can avoid some of the criticisms that were examined in Section I.

4
4.1

RESPONSE TO CRITICS

Kukathas
Given the difficulties Kukathas raises regarding our ability to identify individuals who

are due reparations, we ought to, as I’ve suggested, look to groups as candidates for reparations.
While a group-based approach is able to avoid such issues, such an approach also seems
appropriate given the fact that (as Kukathas suggests) the most heinous historic injustices were
those committed against groups. So then, in the case of slavery, one ought to look to AfricanFor some examples, see Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) “Inequality in Landownership”; Ihlanfeldy and Sjoquist
(1990) “Job Accessibility and Racial Differences in Youth”; and Bertocchi and Dimico (2014) “The Historical
Roots of Inequality.”
23
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Americans, as a group, as a candidate for reparations. Rather than trying to identify which
particular contemporary African-Americans are harmed as a result of the historic injustice, I have
argued that such harm is best conceptualized as a group-based harm. Because individual AfricanAmericans are harmed as group members, the harm that they face is only properly explained by
an appeal to group membership.
However, while we might be able to identify the group to whom reparations are due, in
order to carry out a reparative policy, one might argue that we must identify which individuals
are to count as members of the group. So while African-Americans as a group are owed
reparations, one needs to determine which individuals are to count as members of the group.
Recall that Kukathas raises worries for our ability to do this. As Kukathas suggests, groups have
complex histories and identities, and this makes identifying who counts as a member of the
group in question difficult. Such groups might have committed injustices themselves and
individual members of such groups might be of mixed descent (Kukathas 2006). A related
concern is that the identities of groups are not static, and fluctuate through time (Kukathas 1992).
Here, it seems that such an issue may be more concerned with how to institute reparations
policies that might result from taking a group-based approach, rather than the approach itself.
Given that I am offering a group-based approach to reparations, it seems to me that we merely
need to identify the groups to which reparations are due. In the case of reparations for slavery,
African-Americans, as a group, are owed reparations. However, one might be concerned with
identifying which individuals ought to count as members of a group, such that one can say that it
is these individuals (and only these individuals) that ought to benefit from a reparations policy.
While I do not intend to offer any suggestions on actual reparations plans, given that it seems to
me that the best policies are not policies that will be implemented by giving money directly to
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individuals, such a worry seems unfounded. It seems that the most productive reparations
policies will be policies that are more group-based in nature. Such policies might include
directing greater funding for education in underserved communities with large AfricanAmericans populations.24
4.2

Perez
In Perez’s book, Perez offers the non-identity problem as a reason for why justifying

reparations for historic injustices is problematic. Given that individuals would not have existed
had the injustice not occurred, individuals cannot said to be harmed as a result of the injustice,
nor can they be said to have claims to reparation. Moreover, while we might think that groups
can have intergenerational identities that exist prior to and following the injustice, it seems
unlikely that such injustices would not substantially change the identities of the group in
question. And if the identity of the group has changed, then the group that currently exists is not
the same group as the group that was harmed.
While the purpose of Perez’s chapter here is not to formulate necessary and sufficient
conditions for what makes a collection of individuals a group (in a morally relevant sense), his
analysis here seems to focus on the fact that groups can have an indefinable status internally.
That is, Perez’s analysis seems to focus on the fact that a collection of persons can be a group if
they share some essential characteristics (such as culture, language) and that the group members
identify themselves as belonging to the group. However, his analysis does not seem to fully
consider the implications of the fact that a collection of persons may have an identifiable status
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It seems to me then, that we do not need a completely worked out theory of the necessary and sufficient
conditions for group membership before instituting a reparations policy. However, given the way that May defines
groups, it seems reasonable to me to suggest that, so long as one has been identified as belonging to the group in
question (in cases of externally coherent groups), then one satisfies conditions for group membership.

27

as a group when those outside of the group identify the members as belonging to a group. In
other words, groups can have an identifiable status both internally and externally.
Along with considering a group’s identifiable status, when discussing groups and their
identity, it also seems important to consider which features of a group’s identity we ought to take
to be morally, politically and socially relevant. While Perez does mention some of these features,
one feature that he does not seem to consider is how well off a group is, relative to other groups.
This relative status seems even more important when one considers that the reason for the
inequality is connected with the group’s treatment in the past.
In cases in which one group is much worse off (socially and politically speaking) than
another group, it seems that it is plausible that this relative status might sometimes likely become
(and in the case of some African American groups, has become) a feature of their understanding
of what it is to be a member of the group. If we take the case of slavery and currently living
African-Americans, while the status of African-Americans as a group has significantly improved
since the injustice of slavery, currently, the group is still significantly worse off relative to white
Americans. It seems then that this aspect of the group’s identity might become and continue to
be part of the group members’ understanding of what it means to be a member of the group.
There seem to be two important considerations with the relative status of AfricanAmericans as a group. First, the relative status of African-Americans today, may be said to be
the result of the injustice of slavery, as well as the failure of those responsible to rectify the
injustice. Moreover, the relative status of African-Americans today is more likely to be
connected with their externally identifiable status as a group, than it is likely to be connected
with the group’s internally identifiable status.
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Currently living African-Americans suffer and are disadvantaged from discrimination.
Such discrimination is the treatment that individual African-Americans face when they are
recognized and treated as members of a group. Stereotypes and other harmful perceptions of
African-Americans as a group result in individual members being treated as mere tokens of a
type. As I explained in Section II, this sort of stereotyping is an instance of a group-harm. It is a
group-harm because individuals are wronged when those who perceive themselves to be outside
of the group, mistreat those individuals in virtue of judgments of their group membership.
4.3

Narveson
Recall here that Narevson is critical of any notion of collective responsibility or harm.

And while Narveson’s view offers a forceful critique, rather than giving us reason to reject
notions such as collective responsibility or collective harm, his critique illuminates the care we
must take in explaining such collective notions. Here, it seems to me that Narveson’s critique
does not apply to May’s conception of group action, group harm or group claims.
Recall that May does not argue that group-based concepts, such as group harm, are
irreducibly collective. That is, May does not argue that such notions are not reducible to
individuals. Indeed, May argues that such notions are (in some sense) reducible to individuals.
However, May’s point is that one cannot reduce group-based notions of harm to the harm an
individual suffers as an individual. The only way to fully capture the moral import of certain
individual harms is by making reference to an individual’s group membership. Group notions of
harm are reducible to individuals, only insofar as we understand these individuals to be
individuals in relationships; group-based harms are harms that individuals suffer qua group
member. So, for example, the only way to fully capture the moral import of the discriminatory
treatment of contemporary individual African-Americans is by making reference to the
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individuals’ memberships in particular groups. Individuals who face such discriminatory
treatment as not being treated as individuals, but are being treated as members of a group.
Furthermore, because May’s account is not irreducible in the sense that is the focus of
Narveson’s critique, it seems that his account is also able to avoid the problems with holding
individuals responsible. Recall that, Narveson argues that if we hold collectives responsible, then
we will not be able to hold individuals responsible. However, if we take May’s account of
groups, it seems clear that we both talk meaningfully about group-responsibility, while also
holding individuals responsible for their actions. The same can be said when it comes to groupbased harm. While there is something essentially group-based or collective about the harm
suffered by African-Americans, individual African-Americans are harmed by stereotyping and
other forms of discrimination (both the individuals who are directly harmed, but also the other
members who are harmed indirectly). Moreover, while there is something essentially groupbased about the actions of those who perpetuate such discrimination, ultimately individuals are
responsible for their actions. However, if we fail to recognize that the individuals whom we hold
responsible are responsible as group members, then our analysis, and our holding them
responsible is going to miss something important. Problems (which Narveson cites) may arise
when dealing with group members who do not participate in the collective action, or with
members who do nothing to stop the actions of other group members, but it seems that these
problems are not reasons to reject notions of group action or responsibility.
Here, it might be important to highlight a distinction in the terms of an individual being
‘responsible’ for some state of affairs; a distinction that Narveson seems to be conflating. Here,
Narveson seems to be conflating responsible in the sense that one is guilty for bringing about
some state of affairs, and responsible in the sense that one is liable to correct some state of
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affairs.25 In the case of being guilty, one would be responsible in the sense that her actions are
causally connected to a certain state of affairs. If Raul hits a pedestrian with his car, then Raul is
responsible for the pedestrian’s broken leg in the sense that Raul’s actions brought about this
particular state of affairs. However, one might also be responsible in the sense that one is liable
to correct some state of affairs. Parents for example are typically held liable for the actions of
their child. If a child bites the finger of another child, such that the second child then requires
stiches, the parents of the biter are typically held liable for the actions of their child, even though
it is not the actions of the parents, per se, that brought about the state of affairs.
Moreover, it seems that these two senses of responsibility, that is, guilt and liability are
conceptually distinct. One might not be responsible to correct some state of affairs that one
brought about (ignorance, here might excuse one from such moral responsibility such as in the
case of the biting child). There might also be instances in which a person has some responsibility
to correct some state of affairs, even if she did not bring about the state of affairs. Let’s take the
example of discrimination. An individual might be responsible (that is, guilty) for her individual
discriminations, and as such might be responsible (that is, liable) to make amends to the persons
she discriminates against. However, while this person cannot be said to be guilty of instituting a
social and political structure which allows for the perpetuation of such discrimination, she might
be said to be responsible for the social and political structure in the sense that she is liable for
contributing to the correction of this institutional structure, as well as for providing reparations
for those who are harmed as a result of group-based discrimination.26
Here I’m relying on the distinction between guilt and responsibility made by Arendt (1987).
The case of being responsible for correcting the discriminatory institutional structure, seems to me to be a case of
collective responsibility, and so, the individual per se would not be responsible for correcting the institutional
structure. Rather, such correction is the responsibility of the political community of which she is a member. Here, I
am relying on Arendt’s notion of collective responsibility. The criteria for such responsibility is that the
responsibility stems from something individuals did not do, and such responsibility must be based on involuntary
group membership. While questions of responsibility, and particularly collective responsibility, the focus of this
25
26
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In this section, I have attempted to explain how my group-based approach to reparations
(based on May’s account of groups) can be defended against the critiques of Kukathas, Perez and
Narveson. I have attempted to demonstrate how appealing to groups in the case of reparations for
slavery can avoid some of the issues that arise when trying to justify reparations for slavery on
the individual level. In the following section, I will attempt to respond to some possible
objections that my account may be subject to.

5

OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES

Although he thinks such an approach will ultimately fail, even Kukathas acknowledges
that African-Americans, as a group, are certainly a plausible candidate for reparations. However,
Kukathas worries whether “excluding the descendants of other victims of past injustice is
warranted” (Kukathas 2006, 336). Given that there are other groups who are descendants of
victims of serious injustices, how can one justify reparations to some groups and not others?
While African-Americans were surely victims of serious injustices, other groups such as Chinese
Americans and Jewish Americans, were also victims of serious injustice. Chinese Americans, for
instance, faced severe discrimination, and were the victims of lynchings, riots and massacres.
Furthermore, Chinese Americans also faced institutionalized discrimination at the hands of the
US Government when it passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, an act which outlawed most
Chinese immigration and denied Chinese immigrants citizenship (Spinner-Halev 2012). Given
the serious injustices faced by Chinese Americans in the 1800s, one might argue that AfricanAmericans are no more entitled to reparations than Chinese Americans.

paper is articulate and defend a group-based notion of harm. And so defending this notion of collective
responsibility is outside the scope of this paper.
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In order to determine which groups’ claims to reparations are most urgent, I suggest we
look to Jeff Spinner-Halev’s notion of ‘enduring injustice’. Like Kukathas, Spinner-Halev notes
that the number of individuals who are descendants of victims of past injustice is exceedingly
large. Indeed he writes, “Nearly all of us in the Western world, if not all of us, have ancestors
that have suffered grievous injustices” (Spinner-Halev 2012, 23). However, though he notes this
problem, the conclusion he draws is quite different from the one Kukathas draws. Rather than
undermining reparations claims, Spinner-Halev suggests that “tracing wrongs through
generations, and trying to sort out the identity problem is simply a misguided way to discern
which injustices should concern us today” (Spinner-Halev 2012, 23). Here, Spinner-Halev argues
for a conceptual shift in the way we think about historic injustice.
In his book Enduring Injustice, Spinner-Halev asks, “Of the countless past injustices,
how does one pick which victims of past injustice deserve redress today?” In order to answer this
question, Spinner-Halev argues that one ought to shift the “conceptual ground” away from
historical injustice. What is most salient in issues of historic injustice, he argues, is not that
groups suffered an injustice in the past, but that the group still suffers from an injustice today
(Spinner-Halev 2012). Contemporary injustices that have their origins in historic injustices are
what Spinner-Halev refers to as an enduring injustice. So then, rather than focusing on which
injustices from the past we ought to repair, Spinner-Halev urges one to consider which injustices
from the past persist today. And while his focus is on injustice in the present, his approach is not
ahistorical, as the past does matter for “how we should conceive of injustices, and how we
should think of solutions to them” (Spinner-Halev 2012, 6).
According to Spinner-Halev, enduring injustices have their roots in radical injustices.
Such injustices can include exile, dispossession, cultural dispossession and pervasive
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discrimination. Additionally, a radical injustice can be considered an enduring injustice when it
has lasted for at least two generations and seems likely to persist into the future. Slavery, and the
subsequent Jim Crow era were instances of radical injustice. Because these injustices were not
repaired, they have persisted into present. African American’s claims to reparations are more
urgent than the (potential) claims of other groups, because African-Americans continue to suffer
from the failure of the responsible agent to pay what it owes.
While this conceptual shift allows one to determine which groups’ claims to reparations
are most urgent, one might object to such a shift. One might claim that this shift is too forward
looking, and renders the history of the injustice irrelevant. African-Americans are not due
reparations because of considerations of their welfare in the future, one might argue, but they are
due reparations because of the past injustice inflicted on their ancestors. It is this injustice that
reparations are meant to repair. To claim otherwise would be to miss the point of reparations.27
However, while this criticism is powerful, it is also misplaced.
Recall that Spinner-Halev’s view is not ahistorical. That is, on his approach, the history
of the injustice is not irrelevant. Indeed, the history of the injustice is crucial in determining our
conception of the injustice. Enduring injustices are injustices that have their roots in a historical
injustice. In the case of the enduring injustice suffered by African-Americans, this injustice is
slavery. Due to the failure of the wrongdoer to offer reparations for this injustice, as well as the
subsequent injustices of Jim Crow laws and segregation, this injustice has endured into the
present. And without some sort of attempt at repair, it is likely to endure into the future. So while
this approach is, in some sense forward looking, it not exclusively so. And indeed, the history of
the injustice matters a great deal in justifying the claims to reparations.

27

Authors such as Bernard Boxill might take this line of thought.
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One might also object that claims to reparation can be justified, even if the injustices
suffered by the claimants do not “cry out” for repair (Spinner-Halev 2012, 23). Indeed, one
might argue that all injustices deserve rectification. However, it is important to clarify that my
argument is not that only injustices that cry out for repair deserve reparation. Rather, my
argument is that these injustices should be our immediate concern. So then, while other injustices
might also deserve rectification, given that the enduring injustice suffered by African-Americans
clearly cries out for repair, such claims to rectification are urgent, and deserve some sort of
priority.

6

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have attempted to offer a group-based approach to reparations.
Specifically, I have focused my paper on attempting to provide a group-based approach to
reparations for slavery in the United States. I have argued that appealing to a groups-based
approach is able to avoid some of the issues associated with trying to justify reparations on an
individual level. Specifically, I examined the issues raised by Chandran Kukathas and Nahshon
Perez. In order to justify such an approach, I appealed Larry May’s account of groups. By
appealing to May’s account of groups, I have attempted to demonstrate how such an account can
avoid the criticisms of both Kukathas and Perez. I also argued that May’s account of groups is
properly formulated so as to avoid the criticisms of Jan Narveson. Specifically, I argued that
May’s account of groups is able to avoid the criticisms of those, like Narveson, are skeptical of
any appeals to moral predicates of groups, such as group harm and group responsibility.
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